Trade with China, but don’t fall in love
Canada’s recent trade advances with China—including renewed access for canola, lobster, and beef, alongside the lifting of visa restrictions—have triggered predictable reactions at home. Some see these developments as a long-overdue reset in a strained relationship. Others worry Canada is drifting into geopolitical territory that could unsettle our most important ally, the United States. As is often the case with trade, the reality is more nuanced than either camp suggests.
These developments are welcome. They matter. But they must also be handled with care, discipline, and a clear understanding of their limits.
China remains one of the few markets large enough to materially affect Canada’s agri-food sector. For products like canola, beef, and lobster, access to China can significantly improve farmgate returns, stabilize processing capacity, and support rural economies across the Prairies and Atlantic Canada. These are not marginal exports; they underpin incomes, employment, and investment decisions throughout the supply chain. After years of uncertainty, any step that restores market access offers producers some much-needed breathing room.
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The easing of visa restrictions, while not directly tied to food, should not be dismissed either. Trade depends on people—inspectors, buyers, technical experts, and business leaders. Reducing friction in movement helps normalize commercial relationships and supports the practical work that underpins export growth.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to treat these developments as a return to business as usual. Trade with China has never operated like trade with most of Canada’s other partners. Market access has repeatedly proven conditional, vulnerable to political tensions, and difficult to defend through predictable, rules-based mechanisms. Canadian exporters know this all too well. Canola, pork, beef, and pulses have all been caught in the crossfire before, often with little warning and limited recourse.
For that reason, China cannot—and should not—become a foundation market for Canada’s agri-food sector. It is best understood as an important outlet, not a dependable anchor. Used carefully, it can support incomes and diversification. Relied upon excessively, it can expose producers to abrupt and costly shocks.
It is also important to be clear about what these exports will not do. Expanded trade with China will not raise food prices for Canadian consumers. Export growth benefits producers and processors; it does not translate into more expensive groceries at home. Conflating the two only fuels public confusion at a time when food affordability is already a sensitive issue.
Concerns that increased trade with China will inevitably upset the United States are often overstated, particularly in agriculture. The U.S. itself trades extensively with China and understands the difference between commercial activity and strategic alignment. What Washington watches closely are sectors tied to national security, advanced technology, data, and critical infrastructure. Canola, lobster, and beef do not fall into that category. In fact, a more economically resilient Canada—less dependent on any single export market—is arguably a stronger and more reliable partner for the United States, not a weaker one.
That said, signalling matters. Canada risks trouble when trade with China is framed as a strategic pivot, a political statement, or a substitute for our relationship with the U.S. It should be none of those things. Engagement with China should be quiet, commercial, limited in scope, and firmly grounded in Canadian interests.
The prudent path forward is neither enthusiasm nor fear. It is discipline. Canada should treat China as one market among many, continue expanding trade across Asia-Pacific, invest at home to improve competitiveness and processing capacity, and avoid overconcentration that leaves producers exposed to sudden policy shifts. Export success cannot compensate for weak domestic policy or structural inefficiencies within our own food system.
In the end, these recent trade advances are a net positive. They restore lost ground, support producers, and remind us that engagement—when handled carefully—can still deliver results. But they do not change the fundamentals. China is not a saviour, nor is it an adversary to be avoided at all costs. It is a large, complex, and unpredictable market.
Canada does not need to choose sides. It needs to protect its food system, its farmers, and its economic resilience by trading broadly, cautiously, and without illusions. That is not only good economics—it is good policy.
